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A LINGUISTIC VIEW OF HABERMAS' THEORY 
OF COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE 
ELISABETH LEINFELLNER 
839 South 15th Street 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68508 
Habermas'view of language has been widely discussed in Europe 
and, to some extent, by rhetoricians and philosophers in the United 
States. Here we will present the linguistic point of view. 
Habermas' theory is heavily influenced by concepts taken from 
hermeneutics and Habermas' own sociological views. For instance, 
Habermas uses his concept of "systematic distortion" (i.e. ideological 
distortion in a specific sense) and introduces it into the theory of com-
municative competence. 
Habermas calls his view of language a "theory of communica-
tive competence"; but even though he derives "competence" from 
Chomsky's "linguistic competence," the former's concept of compe-
tence is not to be understood entirely in the sense of transformational 
grammar. 
In the theory of communicative competence, Habermas oper-
ates with the concept of a pragmatic truth-the "consensus theory of 
truth," as he calls it-and what he calls "pragmatic universals." He 
outlines the ideal speech situation which is the one to bring about 
"true" consensus and which is free of external and internal coercion. 
An ideal speech situation is characterized, among other things, by the 
fact that the "roles" of the speakers are interchangeable, that there is 
no systematic distortion, and so on. 
Even from those few remarks, it becomes clear that Habermas 
is not an empiricist, neither from the linguistic nor from the sociolo-
gical standpoint; and this is where part of the weakness of the entire 
theory stems from and where linguistic criticism can start. 
t t t 
DISCUSSION 
Habennas' theory of communicative competence (1971 : 
101-141) has been widely discussed in Europe and, to a lesser 
extent, in the United States. A philosopher's critique of the 
theory of communicative competence unfolds in Bar-Hillel 
(1973:1-11). Here we will present the linguistic point of 
view. 
Habennas begins by using the now famous discrimina-
tion between linguistic competence and linguistic perfonn-
ance. Already, linguistic criticism could be a propos, because 
psycholinguistic data have not wholly supported the differ-
entiation between (innate) competence and perfonnance 
(compare e.g. Jerome Bruner's address to the 21st Interna-
tional Congress of Psychology, Paris). Already a casual inspec-
tion of the speech behavior of children reveals that they are 
not that linguistically competent. (This is exemplified nicely 
by a little "school daze" joke-Note left on the teacher's 
desk: ''Dear Teacher: I have written 'I have gone' a hundred 
times, as you have told me. So now I have went home.") 
But since the competence-perfonnance problem is the respon-
sibility of the linguist or psycholinguist, one should not blame 
the sociologist Habennas for not having solved it. 
Habennas then introduces his own idea that the com-
petence-perfonnance distinction has to be enlarged by the 
concept that the general structures of possible speech situa-
tions can themselves be brought about by linguistic acts. 
Those structures are said neither to belong to the extralin-
guistic conditions under which an utterance is uttered nor to 
be identical with the linguistic entities that are produced by 
means of linguistic competence. Their purpose is the prag-
matic embedding of a speech or speech act (1971 :101). 
It is obvious that Habennas, thus, aims either at the 
philosophical distinction between utterance and sentence or 
at the linguistic distinction between token sentence and type 
sentence or at some other linguistic or philosophical distinc-
tion between the empirical and the theoretical level (e.g., 
word vs. lexeme, etc.). Habennas resorts to the utterance-
sentence distinction and creates some confusion by calling 
utterances "situated sentences" and by speaking of sentences 
as parts of speech acts, i.e. sentences as parts of specific 
kinds of utterances. Although the distinction utterance-sen-
tence has so far proven quite satisfactory, Habennas feels 
himself compelled to introduce a four-fold distinction: 1) An 
utterance is concrete, if it is uttered in a certain empirical 
situation; its meaning is determined also by contingent factors 
-by the personalities of the speaker and the listener and by 
the roles they play in the society (1971 :106-107). A linguist 
might say that at stage one connotation is important. Accord-
ing to Habennas, this concrete utterance is the subject matter 
of what he calls empirical pragmatics, that is, psycholinguis-
tics and sociolinguistics (1971 :108). The empirically minded 
linguist will, nevertheless, ask: What about, for example, 
statistical semantics, articulatory and acoustic phonetics, 
lexicography, ... 1 2) If we abstract from the variable elements 
of a concrete utterance, then we obtain the elementary utter-
ance, which is, according to Habermas, the pragmatic unit of 
speech (1971 :107); it is obviously identical with a speech act 
(1971 :104). The elementary utterance is the subject matter 
of a discipline Habennas wishes to introduce and which he 
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calls ''universal pragmatics" ("Universalpragmatik"; 1971: 
108) or ''theory of communicative competence." 3) In a 
second step we abstract from the performance and, thus, 
retain the unit oflinguistics, the elementary sentence (1971: 
107-108).4) By a fmal step of abstraction, where we do away 
with the performative and other pragmatic linguistic elements 
of stage three, we obtain another elementary unit: the proposi-
tional sentence or the elementary proposition ("elementare 
Aussage"; 1971:107). The elementary proposition is used-
according to Habermas-to reproduce states of affairs (''Sach-
verhalte"; 1971 :107); and according to him, it is predicate 
logic that deals with the elementary proposition. It is to be 
noted that we use ''proposition'' here as translation for "Aus-
sage," not to be confused with the proposition as the platon-
istic meaning of a sentence. 
There are various linguistic questions connected with 
those three abstractions. Since Habermas does not, on the 
one hand, tell us what those variable elements of stage one 
are that are to be removed by abstraction in order to produce 
the elementary utterance, or, on the other hand, why the 
elementary utterances are still utterances, Le. something that 
falls in the category of performance-we plainly do not know 
what the elementary utterance is. Is it speech without the 
"ahs" and ''urns,'' without gestures, without personal style 
and personal mannerisms? Or is the third stage, won by ab-
straction from stage two, purely linguistic? If we interpret 
Habermas here, we have to add that the elementary sen-
tence is un-uttered by any empirical speaker. It seems to 
me that Habermas takes here the concepts of generative gram-
mar all too seriously (1971:107). The idea of restricting 
linguistics to the study of elementary sentences-and elemen-
tary sentences only-is untenable, even if we do not consider 
a linguistics of the Firthian type where, for example, meaning 
is the whole complex of functions a linguistic form may have. 
If we stick to Habermas' opinion on the subject matter of 
linguistics, then linguistics never deals with empirical facts, 
but with something that is already the result of a two~tep 
abstraction. It is, however, linguistics, besides others, which-
starting with empirical discovery procedures-performs the ab-
straction from the concrete utterance to more theoretical 
concepts like the lexeme, the type word, the moneme, or, 
expressed more generally, to the level of the langue (de Saus-
sure). This is the basis of structuralistic linguistics and of 
linguistics as an empirical science as well. If we remove the 
empirical basis of linguistics by removing the concrete and the 
elementary utterance (the speech act), then linguistics severs 
its connections with the empirical languages. 
Stage two is characterized by the fact that so-<:alled 
pragmatic universals become visible; Habermas calls them 
"pragmatic universals" because they can be correlated with 
universal structures of a speech situation, Le., the structure 
that each speaker requires a listener (1971 :109). Looked 
at closely, it seems that the pragmatic universals are of a 
similar nature as the lexemes because Habermas simply pre-
sents them as a list of words and refuses to assign them to a 
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meta-language (1971 :109). Under those circumstances, it 
seems quite unnecessary to introduce three levels of abstrac-
tion and a specific science, called ''universal pragmatics" or 
''theory of communicative competence." 
Let us now have a linguistic look at the speech act (the 
elementary unit of speech = the elementary utterance) as 
conceived by Habermas. According to Habermas-who tries 
to resort here to Austin and Searle-a speech act is always 
composed of two "sentences" (we should better say: linguistic 
elements, parts, etc.)-a performative "sentence" and a pro-
positional "sentence." We have to add here that Habermas' 
pragmatic universals can also be non -performative (i.e., deichtic ; 
1971 : 1 09). There is one exception to the division performa-
tive ''sentence''-propositional ''sentence'': institutionalized 
speech acts do not have to contain a propositional "sentence" 
(''1 thank you" / "I curse you"-Habermas' examples; 1971: 
113). Here a strong idealization occurs because Habermas 
assumes that all sentences, without exception, contain a 
performative element, either empirically, or (still empirically 
hypothetical) in a deep structure. If we take the standpoint 
that linguistics is an empirical science, then the empirical 
absence of something-e.g., the absence of "I know" from 
"(that) the flower is red"-does not imply that we can simply 
say: if it is not here, it is in the deep structure. By the way, 
a problem of the same order arises when Habermas says that 
institutionalized speech acts are dependent upon other speech 
acts, which, as a rule, are not verbalized (1971 :113). This 
is a serious empirical problem that, mutatis mutandis, also 
plagues other sciences: Because the theory demands that there 
is an empirical entity (e.g., a luminiferous ether), one assumes 
it has to be someplace; and in linguistics, the most convenient 
"someplace" is the deep structure. 
A speech act thus divided in two parts can be further 
characterized by the fact that the propositional content of the 
propositional "sentence" stays the same when, for example, 
questions are transformed into commands and commands 
into confessions (1971 :106). It is not entirely clear what 
Habermas means by ''propositional content," but it seems that 
the propositional content is some platonistic or idealistic 
meaning. If so, such a concept must be refused in empirical 
linguistics where one substitutes either the empirical descrip-
tive meaning for it or the meaning as used in the language. A 
further empirical argument-and this argument also concerns 
a good deal of today's linguistics-starts with the observa-
tion that, if nothing else changes when we ''transform'' (e.g., 
questions into commands), at least the syntactic structure of 
the propositional "sentence" changes ("Are you leaving?"; 
"Leave!"; "I confess that I am leaving"; or better, perhaps: "I 
confess that 1 left."). One could now put forth a hypothesis: 
1) The syntactic change indicates a change in meaning, a view 
supported by certain findings in historical linguistics. This 
reverses, of course, the relationship between syntax and· 
semantics as it is usually conceived, or it gives at least syntax 
a semantic aspect; 2) We could draw the conclusion that the 
two utterances-''The water is running" and "I believe the 
water is running"-do not share a common "element" of 
meaning, namely, the meaning of "the water is running," 
but that they are two linguistic entities with two different 
semantic structures. Wittgenstein has argued that in the 
examples, "I expect he is coming" and "He is coming," ''he 
is coming" has in both instances the same meaning because 
our hopes can be fulfilled (I 953: 130e, § 444). But what about 
hopes that can never be fulfilled because they belong to some 
never-never land? And what about the examples, "I dreamt 
that the cows ate square roots" and ''The cows ate square 
roots," where the latter is in conflict with current (English) 
language use and thus meaningless in language-immanent 
semantics as well as in empirical. One could imagine that 
the first case-"(that) the cows ate square roots"-has some 
meaning, although no empirical meaning. It is obvious that 
a meaningful and a meaningless sentence or part of a sentence 
cannot have the same meaning. It would be preferable to say, 
first, that in the case of the example given by Wittgenstein, 
the sameness of meaning is accidental or fictitious as long as 
we are on the language-immanent level and, second, that we 
have to stress that such questions cannot be solved solely by a 
semantics where meaning appears as a language-immanent 
use of the language; we also have to apply an empirical descrip-
tive semantics. 
Despite the recent criticism that has been heaped upon 
interpretative semantics, it seems that a refmed interpretative 
semantics (minus the mentalism ! la Katz) or a structural 
semantics could deal with those problems most adequately. 
(One should not forget that a good deal of computer semantics 
is interpretative; compare, for example, Wilks, 1972, and 
Minsky, 1968.) On a language-immanent level, the ontological 
abyss between intension and extension (one of the character-
istics of an empirical descriptive semantics-or, in Habermas' 
terms, the distinction between the performative "sentence" 
and the propositional "sentence") would be diminished or 
take another shape. For example, the difference between "I 
see that those flowers are red" and "I believe that those flow-
ers are red" would not lie in the fact that the first sentence is 
intentional and the second assertive, butin the fact that "see" 
and "believe" associate-according to present (English, Ger-
man, ... ) language-use with different sets of words. 
Those considerations are essential for Habermas' theory 
of communicative competence also for another reason: He 
uses a consensus theory of truth rather than a correspondence 
theory, an issue which is a philosophical one and which 
we are, therefore, not going to discuss here. 
The last problem we are going to deal with is the prob-
lem of Habermas' ideal speech situation. He states the follow-
ing: 1) The significance of a speech act lies in the fact that 
two people act in agreement or communicate about some-
thing; 2) Communication means the bringing about of true 
consensus. For Habermas' concept of true consensus, we refer 
to Habermas' writings themselves, since true consensus is 
not a linguistic problem; 3) True consensus can be dis-
criminated from false consensus only with reference to an 
ideal or idealized speech situation, i.e., agreement is to be 
reached under ideal conditions which Habermas says are 
counterfactual (1971 :136). The serious empirical linguist 
begins to wonder that perhaps a counterfactual condition of 
an empirical speech act is a contradictio in adiecto. It's as if a 
physicist would say: Perform this mechanical experiment in 
the open air under the (counterfactual) condition that there 
is no air friction. Habermas justifies the idealization of a 
speech act and its ideal preconditions by saying that this is 
an anticipation ("Vorgriff"; 1971 :136 ff.); this reminds us 
of hermeneutic philosophy. In hermeneutic philosophy, 
however, one has to justify one's anticipations by means of 
that which follows, be that which follows the interpretation 
of a given text or a series of actions or speech acts. But since 
the anticipation here is counterfactual, it can never be justi-
fied, and is, therefore, not even an heuristic device. 
A speech situation is ideal if it is neither hampered by 
external, extra-linguistic circumstances (e.g., political ones), 
or by internal, linguistic circumstances; the latter includes the 
absence of what Habermas calls ''systematic distortion" 
("systematische Verzerrung"; 1971 :137). According to 
Habermas, a systematic distortion does not imply that one is 
deceived by means of language, but that language in itself-
for example, ideological language-is deceptive. This pre-
supposes that, in the case of political, ideological language as 
a medium of power and social control, its ideological char-
acter is not revealed by those in power (1970:287). If we 
read in a philosophical dictionary that socialist democracy 
originates and develops together with the working class' 
rise to political power and with the establishment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, then we know that this must 
be a dictionary compiled by a Marxist (Klaus and Buhr, 
1964: 102b). But is this explication of "democracy" really 
distorted and-if it is distorted-distorted in comparison 
to what? A ''western'' explication of "democracy"? But 
"democracy," as the word already implies, practically always 
justifies power and is, thus, always ideological. Therefore, 
from a linguist's standpoint, we could say, with like credence, 
that a ''western'' explication of democracy is systematically 
distorted compared to a Marxist one, if-and only if-the 
Marxist and the "western" use of language have been firmly 
established and the denotations have been agreed upon. The 
linguist can do nothing else but state a change of meaning in 
case the ''western'' and the "Marxist" basic languages are 
essentially the same, as is the case in East and West Germany. 
"Democracy" in different languages can be compared only 
with great difficulty. Otherwise, the linguist has to resort to 
the venerable but false notion that some speech shows "true" 
meanings, whereas other forms of speech do not. Language 
itself has to be considered as a neutral vehicle, quite innocent 
of all the crimes it has been blamed for, including ideological 
distortion. 
Essentially, Habermas argues that the structure of com-
munication itself produces no coercion when-and only 
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when-for all communicators there is a symmetrical distribu-
tion of chances to select speech acts and to perfonn them. 
Then, the roles played by the participants in a dialogue can be 
exchanged, and the communicators will be ~ a state of equal-
ity with respect to the performing of roles in a dialogue 
(1971 :137). If this is an idealization, it does not add any-
thing to the improvement of our speech acts since it is said 
to be counterfactual. And if we remove the counterfactuality 
of this statement and apply it to empirical speech situations, 
we will see that-in most instances-it is plainly false. Language 
conceived in such a way would be partly reduced to the 
symmetrical exchange of pleasantries or of infonnations about 
well established facts, where the persuasive power of speech 
plays no role; in general rhetoric as the art of persuasion would 
have to disappear. Another possibility is what we might call 
a "theorizing" dialogue, i.e., a dialogue where people try to 
reason together and where the symmetrical distribution of 
chances to select and perfonn speech acts is preserved. Such a 
dialogue would be evenly flowing and would appear as if 
staged. If we try to give an example of such a dialogue, we 
might think of the staged dialogues of Plato or of Galilei's 
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. But a 
closer look at, for example, the Platonic Cratylus reveals 
that Cratylus' contributions to the dialogue are often reduced 
to "Yes"; ''No; I do not"; ''Certainly''; "What do you mean?"; 
"Most assuredly"; whereas Socrates plays a dominating and 
domineering role. This is, of course, even more so in real life. 
Speech situations as conceived by Habennas would presup-
pose that all men are not only equal before the law and with 
respect to their chances in society (and even those two equali-
ties exist empirically only in a restricted fonn), but that they 
are also equal with respect to their intellectual capabilities, 
their linguistic fluency, their wit, etc., and that they are all 
dispassionate, even apathetic. Thus, speech is almost always 
asymmetrical, due to the differences in the nature of men, 
and because of the practical demand of avoiding excessive 
expenses and excessive amounts of time and nerves. 
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